no code implementations • 21 Jul 2023 • Ming Chen, Sareh Nabi, Marciano Siniscalchi
Contemporary real-world online ad auctions differ from canonical models [Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2009] in at least four ways: (1) values and click-through rates can depend upon users' search queries, but advertisers can only partially "tune" their bids to specific queries; (2) advertisers do not know the number, identity, and precise value distribution of competing bidders; (3) advertisers only receive partial, aggregated feedback, and (4) payment rules are only partially known to bidders.
no code implementations • 16 Jul 2023 • Xin Guo, Lihong Li, Sareh Nabi, Rabih Salhab, Junzi Zhang
Motivated by bid recommendation in online ad auctions, this paper considers a general class of multi-level and multi-agent games, with two major characteristics: one is a large number of anonymous agents, and the other is the intricate interplay between competition and cooperation.
no code implementations • 4 Feb 2020 • Sareh Nabi, Houssam Nassif, Joseph Hong, Hamed Mamani, Guido Imbens
Our Empirical Bayes method clamps features in each group together and uses the deployed model's observed data to empirically compute a hierarchical prior in hindsight.