no code implementations • 23 Apr 2024 • Nicole Immorlica, Nicholas Wu, Brendan Lucier
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget.
no code implementations • 17 Apr 2024 • Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, James Siderius
We also show a nearly matching lower bound on the retention required to guarantee error $\epsilon$.
no code implementations • 29 Feb 2024 • Kate Donahue, Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
To better understand such cases, we examine the learning dynamics of the two-agent system and the implications for each agent's objective.
no code implementations • 18 Jan 2024 • Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier
To understand the total impact on the content landscape, we study a game between content creators competing on the basis of engagement metrics and analyze the equilibrium decisions about investment in quality and gaming.
no code implementations • 29 Nov 2023 • Keegan Harris, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
After a fixed number of queries, the sender commits to a messaging policy and the receiver takes the action that maximizes her expected utility given the message she receives.
no code implementations • 30 Jan 2023 • Brendan Lucier, Sarath Pattathil, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Mengxiao Zhang
We study a game between autobidding algorithms that compete in an online advertising platform.
no code implementations • 27 May 2022 • Ian Ball, James Bono, Justin Grana, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content.
no code implementations • 26 May 2022 • Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan
We study a communication game between a sender and receiver where the sender has access to a set of informative signals about a state of the world.
no code implementations • 13 Jul 2021 • Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li, Brendan Lucier
We show that when using balanced prices, both these approaches ensure high equilibrium welfare in the combined market.
no code implementations • 1 Dec 2020 • Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman
The value of a match is determined by the types of the matched agents.
Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2020 • Gellert Weisz, András György, Wei-I Lin, Devon Graham, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Csaba Szepesvari, Brendan Lucier
Algorithm configuration procedures optimize parameters of a given algorithm to perform well over a distribution of inputs.
no code implementations • 3 Nov 2020 • Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jack Z. Wang
The goal is to design an evaluation mechanism that maximizes the overall quality score, i. e., welfare, in the population, taking any strategic updating into account.
no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos
In this work we develop algorithms that are able to restore monotonicity in the parameters of interest.
1 code implementation • NeurIPS 2019 • Robert Kleinberg, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Devon Graham
Unfortunately, Structured Procrastination is not $\textit{adaptive}$ to characteristics of the parameterized algorithm: it treats every input like the worst case.
no code implementations • 30 Jan 2019 • Hossein Esfandiari, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Michael Mitzenmacher
We consider online variations of the Pandora's box problem (Weitzman.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2017 • Robert Chen, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We consider robust optimization problems, where the goal is to optimize in the worst case over a class of objective functions.
1 code implementation • 25 Apr 2013 • Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers.
Computer Science and Game Theory J.4; F.2.2
1 code implementation • 4 Dec 2012 • Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Brendan Lucier
Finally, we show that this runtime is optimal (up to logarithmic factors) for any beta and fixed seed size k.
Data Structures and Algorithms Social and Information Networks Physics and Society F.2.2; J.4