no code implementations • 8 May 2024 • Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff
We study law enforcement guided by data-informed predictions of "hot spots" for likely criminal offenses.
no code implementations • 25 Sep 2023 • Yeon-Koo Che, Dong Woo Hahm, YingHua He
Inferring applicant preferences is fundamental in many analyses of school-choice data.
no code implementations • 15 Jul 2023 • Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
We study the optimal method for rationing scarce resources through a queue system.
no code implementations • 30 Aug 2022 • Sarah Auster, Yeon-Koo Che, Konrad Mierendorff
This paper studies sequential information acquisition by an ambiguity-averse decision maker (DM), who decides how long to collect information before taking an irreversible action.
no code implementations • 28 Jul 2022 • Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior.
no code implementations • 6 May 2021 • Yeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong
We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items.
no code implementations • 25 Aug 2020 • Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima, Christopher Thomas Ryan
We characterize Pareto optimality via "near" weighted utilitarian welfare maximization.
no code implementations • 10 Jun 2020 • Yeon-Koo Che, Chongwoo Choe, Keeyoung Rhee
We develop a model of bailout stigma where accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and worsens its funding prospect.
no code implementations • 16 Mar 2020 • Yeon-Koo Che, KyungMin Kim, Konrad Mierendorff
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions.
no code implementations • 15 Nov 2019 • Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima
We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order -- in short, weak monotone comparative statics -- and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices% for a coalition of agents, Nash equilibria of games, and matching theory.