no code implementations • 29 Sep 2023 • Gagan Biradar, Yacine Izza, Elita Lobo, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
We also evaluate them on multiple datasets and show that these explanations are robust to the attacks that fool SHAP and LIME.
no code implementations • 27 Jun 2023 • Jenny Hamer, Jake Valladares, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
We propose a novel data-driven framework for algorithmic recourse that offers users interventions to change their predicted outcome.
no code implementations • 10 Mar 2023 • Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
We study the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with binary supermodular cost functions.
no code implementations • 6 Feb 2023 • Cyrus Cousins, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
This is surprising since for the simpler classes of bivalued additive valuations and binary submodular valuations, MNW allocations are known to be envy free up to any good (EFX).
no code implementations • 3 Jan 2023 • Hadi Hosseini, Justin Payan, Rik Sengupta, Rohit Vaish, Vignesh Viswanathan
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences.
no code implementations • 17 Jun 2022 • Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods when agents have matroid rank valuations.
1 code implementation • 8 Sep 2021 • Gagan Biradar, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick
Thus, our work is the first to formally bridge the gap between model explanations, game-theoretic influence, and causal analysis.
no code implementations • 29 Dec 2020 • Vignesh Viswanathan, Omer Lev, Neel Patel, Yair Zick
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known.