Search Results for author: Vignesh Viswanathan

Found 8 papers, 1 papers with code

Axiomatic Aggregations of Abductive Explanations

no code implementations29 Sep 2023 Gagan Biradar, Yacine Izza, Elita Lobo, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We also evaluate them on multiple datasets and show that these explanations are robust to the attacks that fool SHAP and LIME.

Feature Importance valid

Simple Steps to Success: Axiomatics of Distance-Based Algorithmic Recourse

no code implementations27 Jun 2023 Jenny Hamer, Jake Valladares, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We propose a novel data-driven framework for algorithmic recourse that offers users interventions to change their predicted outcome.

Weighted Notions of Fairness with Binary Supermodular Chores

no code implementations10 Mar 2023 Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with binary supermodular cost functions.

Fairness

Dividing Good and Better Items Among Agents with Bivalued Submodular Valuations

no code implementations6 Feb 2023 Cyrus Cousins, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

This is surprising since for the simpler classes of bivalued additive valuations and binary submodular valuations, MNW allocations are known to be envy free up to any good (EFX).

Graphical House Allocation

no code implementations3 Jan 2023 Hadi Hosseini, Justin Payan, Rik Sengupta, Rohit Vaish, Vignesh Viswanathan

The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences.

Fairness

Yankee Swap: a Fast and Simple Fair Allocation Mechanism for Matroid Rank Valuations

no code implementations17 Jun 2022 Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods when agents have matroid rank valuations.

Model Explanations via the Axiomatic Causal Lens

1 code implementation8 Sep 2021 Gagan Biradar, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

Thus, our work is the first to formally bridge the gap between model explanations, game-theoretic influence, and causal analysis.

Feature Importance

The Price is (Probably) Right: Learning Market Equilibria from Samples

no code implementations29 Dec 2020 Vignesh Viswanathan, Omer Lev, Neel Patel, Yair Zick

Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known.

PAC learning

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