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Found 12 papers, 0 papers with code
Efficient Social Choice via NLP and Sampling
Attention-Aware Social Choice tackles the fundamental conflict faced by some agent communities between their desire to include all members in the decision making processes and the limited time and attention that are at the disposal of the community members.
Foundations for Grassroots Democratic Metaverse
While the physical lives of many of us are in democracies (one person, one vote - e. g., the EU and the US), our digital lives are mostly in autocracies (one person, all votes - e. g., Facebook).
What Should We Optimize in Participatory Budgeting? An Experimental Study
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a process in which voters decide how to allocate a common budget; most commonly it is done by ordinary people -- in particular, residents of some municipality -- to decide on a fraction of the municipal budget.
Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i. e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other.
Proportionality in Committee Selection with Negative Feelings
We study a class of elections in which the input format is trichotomous and allows voters to elicit their negative feelings explicitly.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Participatory Budgeting with Project Groups
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several groupings of the projects, each group with its own budget limit.
In the Beginning there were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
Consider n agents forming an egalitarian, self-governed community.
Multiagent Systems
Egalitarian and Just Digital Currency Networks
Here, we explore the possibility of an alternative digital currency that is egalitarian in control and just in the distribution of created wealth.
A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties.
Proportional Representation in Vote Streams
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting rules; specifically, we consider the Approval-based and the Borda-based variants of both the Chamberlin-- ourant rule and the Monroe rule.
Complexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections
Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders.
Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter.
