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Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).
Balanced Donor Coordination
Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
By weakening ex post efficiency and strategyproofness, we reduce the question of whether RSD is characterized by these axioms for fixed $n$ to determining whether a matrix has rank $n^2 n!^n$.
