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A Two-Stage Mechanism for Demand Response Markets
Moreover, optimal power consumption reductions of the customers depend on the costs that they incur for curtailing consumption, which in general are private knowledge of the customers, and which they could strategically misreport in an effort to improve their own utilities even if it deteriorates the overall system cost.
Incentive Compatibility in Two-Stage Repeated Stochastic Games
In other settings such as iterative auctions or dynamic games where a large strategy space of this sort manifests, it typically has an important implication for mechanism design: It may be impossible to obtain truth-telling as a dominant strategy equilibrium.
An Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for Energy Storage Markets
A key obstacle to increasing renewable energy penetration in the power grid is the lack of utility-scale storage capacity.
