Security Issuance, Institutional Investors and Quid Pro Quo
Security issuance through intermediaries is subject to informational and agency-related frictions. However, separating their effects on securities has been difficult. We estimate those effects separately using SPAC data. To that end, we identify "premium" investors who produce value-relevant information. Their participation is associated with lower liquidation risk and higher returns. In contrast, "non-premium" investors engage only in quid pro quo arrangements. They receive high returns from an intermediary (quid) for participating in weaker future deals initiated by that intermediary (quo). Thus, quid pro quo is not pure agency cost; it includes transfers enabling more firms to go public.
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