Bidding Agent Design in the LinkedIn Ad Marketplace

25 Feb 2022  ·  Yuan Gao, Kaiyu Yang, Yuanlong Chen, Min Liu, Noureddine El Karoui ·

We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a result, the framework allows, for instance, the joint optimization of a group of ads across multiple platforms each running its own auction format. Bidding strategy derived from this framework automatically guarantees the optimality of budget allocation across ad units and platforms. Common constraints such as budget delivery schedule, return on investments and guaranteed results, directly translates to additional parameters in the bidding formula. We share practical learnings of the deployed bidding system in the LinkedIn ad marketplace based on this framework.

PDF Abstract

Code
Add Remove Mark official

No code implementations yet. Submit your code now

Tasks
Add Remove

Datasets

  Add Datasets introduced or used in this paper

Results from the Paper
Add Remove

  Submit results from this paper to get state-of-the-art GitHub badges and help the community compare results to other papers.

Methods
Add Remove

No methods listed for this paper. Add relevant methods here
Contact us on: hello@paperswithcode.com . Papers With Code is a free resource with all data licensed under CC-BY-SA.
Terms Data policy Cookies policy